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BOOK REVIEW
THE SUPREME COURT IN CRisis: A HISTORY OF CONFLICT. By Robert
J. Steamer.' The University of Massachusetts Press, 1971. Pp. viii,
330. $9.50.
This book is based on the not altogether imaginative idea that the
role of the United States Supreme Court in the American political sys-
tem can be understood in terms of a history of the periods of antago-
nism and political ferment between the non-elected Court and the pop-
ular branches of the federal government, particularly Congress. One
is very tempted to yawn and say deja vue about the approach Pro-
fessor Steamer takes, but to the student of constitutional history the
book provides a succinct account of the "leading cases" of the various
periods and their political consequences.
The first chapter deals with the pre-constitutional period and Bri-
tish influences which shaped the structure of the American judiciary
and provided the genesis of judicial review. The succeeding seven
chapters all use the same structure and format. The first step is to
introduce biographically the Chief Justice and the men who served
during the particular Chiefs tenure while assessing the contributions
of the various justices. Next comes a summary recital and sometimes
discussion of the leading cases during the Chiefs tenure followed by
an analysis of the political repercussions from Congress and the Pres-
ident. Marshall and Taney each get separate treatment while Chase
and Waite, Fuller and White, Taft and Hughes, and Stone and Vinson
have to share chapters. Chief Justice Warren's court from 1953-58
is handled in the treatment of Stone and Vinson, and the concluding
chapter covers the balance of the Warren tenure which followed the
judicial crisis of 1958.
Professor Steamer does not hesitate to offer his opinions and expla-
nations of judicial conduct-this is no Charles Warren history of the
Court. The underlying theme expressed early in the book and woven
throughout the text is that (a) public controversy provoked by Court
1. Professor of Government, Lake Forest College.
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decisions results from a misconception of the judicial-political role of
the Court and (b) there is a lack of consensus within the political
branches of government over what the proper role of the Court should
be. The Warren Court, nonetheless, fashioned a new role:
In the main the justices collectively and individually must act as the
nation's conscience when they sit in judgment of the entire govern-
mental process from the popular will to the actions of legislatures,
presidents, governors, and a host of law-making and law-administering
bodies.2
We all know the proper role of the Supreme Court has been debated
in dozens of studies going back at least to the Progressive era, but
Steamer provides something different by discussing the Court-curbing
proposals in each historical period. The author does not attempt to
discuss reactions within the states during Court-curbing periods but
limits his discussion to Congress and the President. This is a serious
shortcoming since the role of the Court as umpire of the federal sys-
tem is a crucial one and has been responsible for much of the antagonism
to specific Court decisions. Steamer attempts to save himself from
criticism on this score by pointing out that congressmen do, in fact,
reflect state and local viewpoints and prejudices.
The introductory chapter suggests that the vice-admiralty courts in
the colonial period were the forerunners of the federal courts and that
judicial review is rooted in British imperial practice stemming from
Privy Council disallowance of colonial laws. The development of
standardized admiralty procedure was an antecedent of the national
court system even though there was no independent federal judicial
system under the Articles of Confederation. At no time did the state
courts command final word on all justiciable matters.
Like other sections of the U.S. Constitution, there was initial dis-
agreement about key provisions of the judicial article. Judicial selec-
tion, for example, was a compromise between election by the legisla-
ture and appointment by the executive. The creation of inferior courts
was left to congressional discretion. While tenure and independence
of the judiciary was a matter of general agreement, several major
topics were left indeterminate, e.g., appellate jurisdiction, judicial re-
view, the number and qualifications of judges, and the nature and ex-
tent of lower federal courts.





Next Professor Steamer moves on to the Marshall era which, along
with the Civil War period and the 1937 judicial "revolution," consti-
tutes the period of most intense and serious political opposition to
judicial power. Marshall had a much harder time than his succes-
sors, and Steamer maintains that because article III left some im-
portant questions re judicial structure and power up to legislative dis-
cretion, "[T]he stage was set for frequent legislative-judicial altercations
which at times have almost reached an irreparable constitutional cri-
sis.",
Early in Marshall's tenure, two provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789 caused problems: (a) the requirement of circuit-riding by Jus-
tices and (b) the section which permitted an appeal to the Supreme
Court when a state court denied a claimed federal right. Federalists
relieved the justices from the onerous duty of circuit-riding by an
Act of 1801, but the Jeffersonians promptly repealed the legislation
on the grounds that the additional judgeships created by the Act were
an unnecessary burden and expense. Clearly, Congress was acting
within its powers, but the restoration of circuit-riding was a poor
decision in terms of judicial efficiency.
The upshot of a number of Marshall's opinions was that, when deal-
ing with the question of the limits of judicial and legislative power,
economic conservatism and nationalism became the competitors of
radicalism and states' rights. Beginning in 1821 and continuing until
his death, Marshall had to contend with recurring challenges to judi-
cial power. These took the form of state non-compliance with Court
orders, proposals limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts, repeal of
Section XXV of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and limited tenure of fed-
eral judges. Professor Steamer rightly points out that Georgia's re-
fusal to abide by Supreme Court orders was the most serious threat
to judicial authority and concludes that these efforts to limit judicial
power were really a reflection of a struggle for power between the
states and the national government. By the 1830's, a national con-
sensus-somewhat precarious-had been nurtured which acknowledged
that Supreme Court pronouncements on the fundamental law must be
binding on private parties, the states, and branches of the federal gov-
ernment. While one could argue that President Jackson was no firm
supporter of this consensus, Steamer points out that Jackson did sup-
3. Id. at 24.
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port judicial review, asked for the Force Bill which enlarged the jur-
isdiction of federal courts, and refused to support any measure which
would have weakened the judiciary. At no time during the Marshall
era could a majority be produced to reduce the power of the Supreme
Court-the forces of nationalism clearly dominated the interests fav-
oring localism and particularism.
It was during the Taney period, however, that even the Supreme
Court could not preserve the political, let alone legal, consensus that
national unity was paramount. Before Taney stumbled over the issue
of slavery, his court had to deal with political issues which were pro-
duced by the clash, between the propertied and propertyless segments
of the nation. Professor Steamer gives Taney high marks as Chief Jus-
tice and accounts for his lack of judicial innovation in constitutional
doctrine in comparison to the pre-eminent Marshall as the result of
his unwavering commitment to democratic majorities. The three most
significant areas for judicial construction concerned the inevitable
conflicts between economic classes, questions of federalism, and the
issue of slavery. Steamer rightly argues that the vested rights of prop-
erty doctrines attributed to Marshall remained intact at the end of
the Taney tenure. Questions dealing with the relationship between the
nation and the states were resolved with what Steamer calls "a balance
between contradiction and consistency. . .. -4 He singles out as most
important the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson which certainly expanded ju-
dicial power, the Cooley doctrine which espoused the "selective ex-
clusiveness" version of the commerce power, and the "political ques-
tions" doctrine of Luther v. Borden.
It is the analysis of the slavery controversy, however, to which
Steamer devotes his most detailed and searching attention. This con-
stitutes one of the best sections of the book. We are told that which-
ever way it had decided the Dred Scott issue, the Court could not
have altered the social and political forces leading toward civil war.
At most, it could have delayed the outcome a few years. Taney had
initially not planned on writing an opinion, and it is difficult to account
for the fact that rather than acquiesce in the judicial pronouncements
of Justice Nelson, Taney produced a long and complex opinion which
grappled with every issue raised by the case. Taney concluded that
Negroes were considered inferior beings at the time the Constitution
was adopted and were not intended to be included in the term "citi-




zens." Next he ruled that Dred Scott could not become free as a
result of living in Missouri because the Missouri Compromise was un-
constitutional. Finally, having returned to Missouri from Illinois, Scott's
legal status was determined by the law of Missouri where he was consid-
ered a slave and not entitled to sue in the federal courts.
Steamer attempts to rehabilitate the tarnished image of that wicked
apologist for the slavocracy by stating:
To attack Taney as ideologically motivated and evil in his intent seems
grossly unjust. He had opposed slavery for many years and had freed
the slaves he had inherited except for two who could not support them-
selves . .. .5
This reviewer is not persuaded that the Taney effort to defuse the
issue of slavery was simply an error in judgment because he was not
personally committed to the perpetuation of slavery.
The Supreme Court, at any rate, had enjoyed high respect and pres-
tige from the death of Marshall to the Dred Scott decision. There
were only isolated congressional speeches attacking Court opinions.
There was no genuine interference with judicial independence. But
Dred Scott provoked the most extended legislative attack upon the
Court. The ensuing debates in Congress amounted to a reconsidera-
tion of the proper role of the Supreme Court as well as debate over the
nature of the Union and status of slavery. Steamer surveys the anti-
and pro-Court forces and the substance of their arguments; he points
out that even on as emotional an issue as slavery, on which advocates
held the most impassioned views, there were a few middle-of-the-road-
ers who supported the Court. Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois
said that "he would abide by the decision of the Supreme Court, not
only as a matter of policy, but from considerations of duty."6 Steamer
reaches the doubtful conclusion that the Taney Court exercised ju-
dicial review at a propitious moment. If many more years had passed
without invoking this power, it would have become a constitutional dead
letter. That it was exercised over the issue of slavery meant that Con-
gress, because of its internal disunity, could not muster enough sup-
port to curb the power of the Court.
Chapter IV covers the tenure of Chief Justices Chase and Walte and
is subtitled "The Period of Relative Calm." Steamer tends to mini-
mize the decline in the stature of the Court in the post-Civil War
5. Id. at 77.
6. Id. at 92.
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period and argues that the retreat of the Court in that period has been
exaggerated. He marshalls such evidence as the fact that the Supreme
Court declared ten federal and forty-six state laws unconstitutional
during the Chase tenure from 1864-73. This is revisionist judicial
history which downgrades the importance of the alteration of the
Court's size three times in ten years, the removal of appellate juris-
diction over the Reconstruction statutes, and the packing of the Court
as a result of the legal tender decisions. These were genuine threats
to judicial independence. Steamer argues, on the contrary, that ju-
dicial review had truly become a force to reckon with.
He devotes several pages to congressional reaction to Ex parte Mil-
ligan and Ex parte McCardle. His conclusion about McCardle is that
it illustrates the weakness of judicial power-had Article IllI been
more explicit in defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, it
could not later have been contracted. But the radicals were on strong
constitutional ground in repealing a jurisdiction which they had granted.
Steamer concludes: "To snatch away a case already docketed is still
another question. The spirit of the American constitutional heritage
was certainly violated, and the Supreme Court might have said so."17
Judicial review is a political as well as a judicial power, and perhaps it
was wise for the Court to collapse on this issue rather than risk the re-
taliation of radicals in Congress against the continuation of judicial
review.
The tenure of Chief Justice Waite is sympathetically reviewed as a
contest for judges' minds between the intellectually superior and
mildly anti-democratic Justice Field and the humanitarian and demo-
cratic Chief Justice. On economic issues, the record of the Waite
Court permitted some regulation of growing corporate enterprise and
rejected the Spencerian doctrines of Social Darwinism. The Slaugh-
terhouse Cases interpreted the fourteenth amendment cautiously in
order not to create a radical alteration between state and federal power.
It was in the area of civil rights that the Waite Court was disappoint-
ing because it narrowed the meaning and scope of the Civil War
Amendments. Steamer makes the significant point that de-racializing
the fourteenth amendment and interpreting it to protect economic
freedom but not eradicate racial discrimination was our greatest national
catastrophe.' Steamer's explanation for this draws upon the work of
7. Id. at 111.





At bottom the new attitude was based on economic and political
motives of expediency, profits and power. A South beset by racial
strife would not attract capital, and since the quest for Negro equality
stood in the way of economic expansion and profit-making, stability
soon took precedence over the Negro cause.9
The next chapter covers the periods of Chief Justices Fuller and
White and is characterized as the era of conservatism and revival of ju-
dicial activism. The case which marks the change in judicial orien-
tation is the Minnesota Rate Case decided in 1890 which announced
that rate making was a matter for judicial consideration requiring due
process of law. This opinion practically overruled Munn v. Illinois.
It opened the door to the expansion of judicial supervision of legisla-
tures which we call substantive due process.
Just at the time that judicial conservatism in economic matters was
becoming entrenched, agrarian discontent expressed by the Populist
Party and labor violence at Homestead, Pennsylvania shocked most
Americans of that time. Supreme Court hostility to state economic
regulation was one matter, but there were three opinions in 1895
which helped solidify and mobilize congressional criticism of the
Court-they were, of course, the Sugar Trust Case which made the
Sherman Act ineffective against manufacturing monopolies, the In-
come Tax Case which invalidated the 1894 federal income tax of 2% on
personal and corporate incomes over $4,000, and the Debs Case which
upheld a federal court injunction halting the Pullman strike on the
grounds that the strike was an interfemce with interstate commerce.
Social Darwinism began more and more to permeate the Court pro-
nouncements which bolstered property rights against public regulation.
The result was Progressivism which not only opposed individual de-
cisions but judicial power in general. In the U.S. Senate, the names
of Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, Hiram Johnson of California,
Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, and William E. Borah of Idaho among
others were closely associated with attacks upon the Court as the de-
fender of the vested interests and opponent of valid national regula-
tion of the economy.
Upon Fuller's death in 1910, Justice White moved from Associate
Justice to the center chair. The ensuing period was one of less pro-
nounced hostility to governmental regulation of economic matters. The
9. Id. at 120.
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White Court approved national regulatory measures (with the excep-
tion of the Child Labor Case), but disallowed state regulations of
interstate commerce thus giving Congress little grounds for complaint.
Three cases involving racial discrimination showed that the Court was
willing to interpret equal protection in a more comprehensive way.
Professor Steamer summarizes the Fuller-White years this way:
The period from 1882-1921 is not one in which the Court can be
said to have maintained a consistent posture on constitutional ques-
tions. . . But it is interesting to note that even at the height of the
Court's 'carnival of unconstitutionality,' even after Pollock, Debs,
and Knight, there was no sustained attack on the Court in Congress,
but merely a feeble thrust here and there.10
True, but does one not have to look beyond Congress for criticism of
the Court in this period? It was after 1895 that Progressives, Pop-
ulists, and members of the Bar spoke of the Court in the most bitter
and stingingly critical terms. In each session of Congress for a num-
ber of years, income tax bills were introduced as a taunt to the Court's
decision in Pollock.
The Taft and Hughes years paved the way for the most important
crisis between the Court and popular branches of government since the
Civil War. During the tenure of Chief Justice Taft (1921-30), all
three branches of the federal government espoused the same conserva-
tive viewpoint, and there was a marked decline in regulatory legislation.
Steamer's evaluation of Taft is most generous: "his innate ability
combined with a love of judicial power and a real learning in the
law surely place him close to Marshall and Taney. . . ."I' This inflated
judgment about Taft reminds me of the quip of Justice Brandeis who
described Taft as "first rate second rate." Be that as it may, Steamer
summarizes the major Taft opinions on economic due process, the na-
tional commerce power, and civil liberties.
Moving on to Chief Justice Hughes, Steamer justifiably empha-
sizes that great judge's accomplishments in civil liberties and equal
protection of the laws. He does not stress the opportunist and shift-
ing voting pattern of Hughes in the crisis years of 1935-37.
The 1934 term provided a false hope that the Hughes Court would
be hospitable to the Roosevelt New Deal Legislation. Between Janu-
ary, 1935 and June, 1936, on the contrary, the Court delivered twelve
10. Id. at 169.




major decisions unfavorable to the President. Collectively, they con-
vinced him that the remaining major elements of the New Deal, e.g.,
Social Security Act, National Labor Relations Act, and the Public Util-
ity Holding Company Act, would also fail to pass muster in the Court.
Our author discusses the twelve cases in chronological order and ef-
fectively builds up to the Court reorganization plan of February, 1937.
The President's proposal initially had the support of only one hun-
dred congressman and thirty senators, but Roosevelt thought that a ma-
jority could be produced eventually. Presidential advisors divided over
the proper strategy to obtain congressional approval and those who
favored a no compromise stance on the Court packing plan won since
they had the President on their side. Chief Justice Hughes' letter to
the Senate Judiciary Committee absolutely discredited the President's
claims that the Supreme Court was unable to keep abreast of its docket.
It provided timely ammunition to the opponents of the bill and, of
course, the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish opinion of March 29,
1937 provided "the switch in time that saved nine." In June, 1937,
the Judiciary Committee issued an unfavorable report calling the Court
bill 'needless," "futile," and an "utterly dangerous abandonment of
constitutional principle.' 1  This crisis, Steamer believes, was "perhaps
the only time in our history that a congressional majority might have
been mustered which would have seriously altered the Supreme Court's
role in the American system."' 13  In politics, the Justices won the
contest, but in law the President triumphed.
The decade 1937-47, Steamer decides, can best be described as a re-
visionist period in which the Court assiduously avoided striking down
acts of Congress but was willing to overturn a number of state laws in
both the economic and civil liberties areas.
Chapter VII covers the Stone, Vinson, and first phase of the War-
ren Court (1953-58) and is called a period of retreat, rejuvenation, and
a new crisis. Collectively, the men named by Roosevelt were the "most
distinguished made by any president in American history." Dealing
rather briefly with the cases which exemplified the return to the
broad conception of national power, Steamer devotes more attention
to the civil liberties cases of the Stone Court, especially those dealing
with the free exercise of religion and separation of church and state.
12. Id. at 215.
13. Id. at 216-17.
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The Stone period was a period of conflict in the Court rather than be-
tween Court and the Congress and President.
The Vinson Court (1947-53) was uncertain of its proper role al-
though it began to spend more time considering civil liberties cases, in
Steamer's view. In another revisionist mood, Steamer says it is
unfair to call the Vinson Court unwilling to protect civil liberties be-
cause much of what it accomplished had begun -under Stone or was the
beginning of judicial doctrine that would be pursued more imagina-
tively under Warren. Generalization about civil liberties as a cate-
gory is really unwise, according to the reviewer, because the Vinson
Court made progressive strides in some areas, e.g., racial discrimina-
tion and movie censorship, but clearly retreated or vacillated in others,
e.g., regulation of subversive activities and separation of church and
state, while in cases dealing with freedom of assembly and free expres-
sion it equivocated, e.g., compare Feiner v. New York with Termi-
niello v. Chicago or Saia v. New York with Kovacs v. Cooper. Steamer
discusses no congressional response to the Vinson period either pro or
con and eagerly moves on to analyse the Warren era.
Earl Warren, the fourteenth Chief Justice, was, after Marshall, the
most influential judge to shape American constitutional jurisprudence.
As an opinion writer, Steamer considers Warren unimpressive; his
opinions "though competent, are somewhat loose and rambling, often
devoid of even elementary legal reasoning, and to the judicial crafts-
man, they are shockingly without precedents. . .. -14 This is being
pretty hard on Warren, but Steamer adds that despite shortcomings as a
legal scholar, Warren combined those qualities that gave him authority
which was accepted both by his colleagues and the American people. If
this is taken at face value, one must ignore the Resolution of the State
Chief Justices in 1958, the chilliness of the American Bar Association to-
ward Warren Court policy making as well as the Southern Manifesto!
The crisis of 1957-58, Steamer argues, was different from all those
of the past with the possible exception of the Marshall era. It was
precipitated by the fact that the Warren Court was redefining its judi-
cial role. The Court moved ahead of the popular branches and the
will of the majority of the people in its protection and expansion of
civil rights and liberties.
Decisions involving the loyalty-security program, regulation of sub-




versive activities, congressional investigations, access to FBI files, and
membership in state bar associations, among others, so antagonized
many congressmen that a judicial crisis was provoked by 1958. The
Eighty-fifth Congress spawned thirty proposals to alter the Court's work
or its functions. Steamer sorts them into three principal categories: (1)
those which would reverse the Court's interpretations of certain stat-
utes, (2) those limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, and
(3) proposals fixing qualifications for judicial office. Seven of these
measures were given serious attention by Congress, and only one, the
Jencks bill, was made law. It permitted the defense in a prosecution by
the government to request statements made by witnesses which were
in the possession of the U.S. Government, and the trial judge would de-
cide whether that request would be granted or strike the witness's testi-
mony from the record. No devastating blow to the Court's authority,
surely!
The Jenner-Butler bill, however, constituted the most serious and
drastic assault upon the Supreme Court. It would have eliminated
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court in five significant areas--con-
tempt of Congress, federal loyalty-security programs, regulations of
employment and subversive activity in public schools, state anti-sedition
laws, and admission to law practice in any state. These areas were
the principal areas in which the Court had begun to render important
civil libertarian decisions! In diluted form, the Jenner proposal nar-
rowly missed passage in the Senate.
How does Steamer account for this crisis? It was the culmination
of several long standing historical trends which produced pressure upon
the Justices to act. The thrust for racial equality on the political and
social levels was one such trend. The second historical force "was the
rise of new ideological theories of social organization, the purposes
of which were to free the oppressed worker from industrial serfdom
under systems of unrestrained capitalism."' 5  What does this mean,
anyway? Under this "historical trend," at any rate, Steamer places the
subversion cases! The third historical trend he calls an "inexorable
movement toward national unity," which also seems fearfully amor-
phous and vague. The result in terms of Court decision-making was
that since both state and national governments had abdicated their re-
sponsibility for guarding constitutional rights, the Supreme Court stepped
15. Id. at 258.
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into the breach. The Court did not seek this role, it was drawn into it.
Why didn't the legislative retaliation succeed? Because the Court had
enough determined supporters in the Senate.
The final chapter deals with the remaining Warren Court years,
1958-69. Steamer notes that most areas of judicial innovation in
this period were at the expense of state discretion in such areas as
the rights of persons accused of crime, legislative apportionment, reg-
ulation of obscene material, racial equality, and prayer in public
schools. Congress reacted to these decisions largely as a body which
reflects powerful state interests which viewed the decisions of the
Court as the cause of a crisis in federalism. The underlying value in
each of these significant areas of constitutional interpretation is equal-
ity.
Professor Steamer covers a wide range of the major decisions which
need not be discussed in detail. He explores the genesis of congres-
sional opposition to the criminal procedure opinions which culminated
in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a statute
of "dubious constitutionality" which was "the most serious and ir-
responsible meddling of all time with what traditionally have been
judicially determined constitutional rights.""0  Why did Congress en-
act this unwise measure? Steamer believes that the summer of 1968
was a calamitous time of national disunity over the Vietnamese War,
and congressional -leaders decided to divert their attention to the law
and order issue and "do something" to restore peace to America's
cities. The 1968-69 term of the Court which concluded Warren's
tenure saw no retreat in the fields of racial discrimination and reap-
portionment. The Court made at least seven decisions overturning
convictions involving freedom of speech.
Steamer concludes his book with a plea for the status quo, even
though he admits that the principal theme of his study is that there is per-
petual conflict and periodic crisis between Court and the other ele-
ments of the federal government. Our Supreme Court has be-
come the means of accomodating rule by the people with the rule of
law. In performing this high responsibility, there is bound to be antago-
nism. Sometimes the result is sloganeering about "judicial tyranny"
and "judicial legislation."
On other occasions, however, there have been proposals to reduce
future conflict. These proposals fall into two principal categories:




(1) those which would alter the makeup of the Court's membership
and (2) those which would restrict judicial review. The former group
includes those which would require prior judicial service for Supreme
Court members, a fixed term for justices, a statutorily fixed retirement
age, or an increase in the size of the Court. Professor Steamer dis-
misses all as without merit. Certainly, prior judicial service and great-
ness in a Supreme Court judge do not go hand in hand, and a fixed
term would render judges less independent of popular opinion.
The second category of reforms would alter appellate jurisdiction or
require an extraordinary majority or unanimity in order to declare a
statute unconstitutional. To revise the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court as the Jenner bill attempted is truly "kill the umpire" legislation.
It would repudiate the role of the Court as the final arbiter of the fed-
eral system. To require an extraordinary majority in striking down
state or federal laws, Steamer tells us, would cut down judicial review
thus giving broader leeway to legislative policy. It would bolster popu-
lar majorities which have never been strong supporters of civil liberty.
Although judges may not be detached and objective in their judg-
ments, their discretion is canalized by the traditions, values, and method-
ology of the legal process. The judge's role is both conservative and
innovative because he "performs a creative act not only by interpret-
ing the social conscience, but by helping to 'form and modify the
conscience he interprets." 7
Judicial review has survived, Steamer concludes, because it has been
grounded in sound, logical reasons for placing limits on governmental
power. If the Court's decisions are opposed by enough people,
there are constitutional means to overturn the Court's judgment. That
the court has been reversed so infrequently in nearly two centuries is a
tribute to judicial responsibility and an indication that the American
people endorse this mild check on popular government.
Professor Steamer's study of the periods of crisis in Supreme Court
history is a useful summary treatment of the topic with some insightful
observations. The biographical information about members of the
Court is selected with care. The reviewer does not consider its theme
as particularly original but as falling in the mainstream of that vast lit-
erature which has debated the pros and cons of judicial review.
JAMES R. KERR*
17. Id. at 288.
* Associate Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University.
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